Abstraci2-Cloud computing is evolved from grid computing with a key support from the rapidly expanding virtualization technology. We argue that clouding computing is particularly suitable for supporting emergency response and management Ma (2008 Ma ( , 2009 Ma ( , 2010 . We use banking system survivability as an example to illustrate the proposed research agenda.
INTRODUCTION
It is generally recognized that six major paradigms of computing technology have been evolved since the invention of modem electronic computers, including: mainframe, PC, client-server, Internet, grid, and the latest cloud computing. Cloud computing is evolved fr om grid computing and has been greatly shaped by the rapidly expanding virtualization technology. To some extent, it is also a return to mainframe technology given its centralized management of the computing infrastructure, which is often hosted in remote data centers located in regions where energy and cooling systems are more environment friendly. We argue that clouding computing should be particularly suitable for supporting emergency response and management (ERM) systems thanks to some of its inherent technological advantages such as the extreme flexibility in setup, deployment and management of the computing resources, as well as building nearly everything (platforms, applications, storages) as services. Of course, the other advantages of cloud computing such as "time-space limit free" computing, high performance and scalable storage, the capability to process and analyze gigantic amount of heterogeneous data, and the ability to integrate distributed and centralized computing platforms, all are very attractive for ERM. Nevertheless, it is the weakest link that determines the practical utility of a technology. In the case of cloud computing supported (CCS) ERM, noted as CCS ERM hereafter, what are the limiting fa ctors that will constrain the wide adoption of CSS-ERM in practice? Can those limiting fa ctors be overcome? In this article, we argue that reliability, security and survivability are often the key fa ctors that will determine the success or failure of a CSS ERM system perhaps mainly because they are frequently ignored by the commercial service providers of cloud computing. This situation seems particularly obvious when it comes to the terms of service reliability and survivability, which often are dealt with the legal jargons in the service agreements dictated by cooperate lawyers. Of course, we recognize the necessity of using legal power in dealing with complex management issues, especially when those legal terms are dictated with the solid inputs fr om cooperate scientists and engineers. What we are concerned in this paper is that, at the present stage of cloud computing, insufficient attentions to the uniqueness of reliability and survivability of cloud computing may be preventing scientists, engineers, and legal experts to work out the service agreements that can maximally serve the interests of the pUblic. In other words, we believe that reliability and survivability should be top research agenda of cloud computing, especially for cloud computing aimed at supporting ERM.
The security of cloud computing has received much more attention than its agnate peers-reliability and survivability. A convenient example is the public debates on the "Federal Cloud Computing Strategy" recently issued by the Federal CIO of the Obama Administration, which outlines the US Federal Government's 20-billion budget migration plan to the cloud computing IT platform (Kundra 20 11) . It is interesting to note that much of the critics and defenses by the fe deral CIO's office, has been fo cused on the security of cloud computing. However, little attention seems to have been given to reliability or survivability. In fa ct, it is a consensus in scientific and technology communities, that security, reliability and survivability have their own niches and one cannot overtake the others, although that the niches are often overlapped. Given the highly asymmetric attentions directed to the three niches, in this paper, we fo cus on reliability and survivability of cloud computing, with particular references to the cloud computing developed for supporting ERM systems.
Given the enormous diversity of ERM systems, it is not possible to present a single CCS-ERM architecture that fits to all ERM events. Yet, it is very helpful to study an abstract CSS-ERM system to capture the essential characteristics 2 and requirements. A dilemma is that an overly abstract CSS-ERM may become a mathematical artifact, and is not necessary docile for exploring the insights for dealing with reliability and survivability. In the present study, we adopt a hybrid approach, using abstract models supported with the example of banking system survivability.
The extreme complexity of ERM is obvious. In the case of bank system, multiple complex systems are involved. First, we have banking system of a country or region to be protected, which can be conceived as the "physical system," the IT infrastructure (assuming cloud computing) to support the physical system, and a CCS-ERM system, which is most likely part of the IT infrastructure. The CCS-ERM system, in the case of bank system, may include an ERM team and backup system or resources to quickly setup a backup banking system at the team's disposal. In addition, without a good understanding on the reliability and survivability of the banking system itself, the CCS-ERM is similar to protect the skin of a patient who may die from heart fa ilure. Therefore, in this paper, we will also deal with the reliability and survivability of banking system itself, besides the CCS EMR designed to protect it.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as fo llows: Sections 2 and 3 present overviews on cloud computing and CCS ERM systems, respectively. Sections 4 & 5 discuss their reliability and survivability. Section 6 introduces the CCS ERM architecture and its implementation with banking system as an example. In this architecture, besides the CCS ERM for support banking system operation, we also include recent research advances on banking system survivability and systemic risks made in mathematical fm ancing and ecological science.
AN OVERVIEW ON CLOUD COMPUTING
There is not a commonly accepted definition for cloud computing. This should not be surprising. Entering the 21 sl century, computer scientists and IT technologists have been vigorously searching for new and better alternatives computing paradigms to the client-server paradigm, which "destroyed" mainframe technology and pushed the explosive expansion of the Internet. The revolutionary changes the Internet technology has brought forth seem to have shadowed many succeeding technologies invented so far including grid computing, ubiquitous computing, pervasive computing, and grid computing. However, rapidly expanding cloud computing seems to be an exception that has achieved sufficiently conspicuous position.
Cloud computing is evolved from grid computing. The technology that enables inter-grid resource sharing is the inter-grid gateway (lGG) and virtualization technology. Virtualization, i. e., building virtual machines (VM), provides effective provides solutions for interconnecting heterogeneous distributed infrastructures such as grids. CPU/GPU multicore technologies make VM much more adoptable since multicore host machine is powerful enough to support many VMs. The advantages of VM include (Costanzo et al. 2009 ): server consolidation (allowing system administrators to combine multiple underutilized servers in fe wer machines); running legacy code without interfering with new application or OS (operating systems) APIs; improved security by creating sandboxes for running application with questionable reliability; performance isolation (allowing service providers to offer different computing power to different users); running different OS on the same physical machine; providing flexible building blocks for building complex virtual networks and/or clusters.
Cloud computing can mean different things to different people. The US NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) has revised its "Working Definition of Cloud Computing" no less than 15 times. A key to understanding cloud computing fr om the security perspective is to recognize that the technology is largely not new, or untested (DoH-National Cyber Security Division. 2010). Although this opinion may be a little bit over optimistic, it certainly has its From the user perspective, the most important concept in cloud computing should be "as a Service" (asS), such as IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service). The services are more like "utilities" (e.g., phone, electricity, water supplies), which a user can subscribe to based on his needs. From an ownership perspective, cloud computing may be distinguished as public cloud, shared cloud, private cloud, dedicated cloud, hybrid cloud.
From a technological perspective, the most important fe ature of cloud computing is undoubtedly virtualization technology, which offer unprecedented flexibility to transform physical computing infrastructure resources into easily customable IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS. Virtualization also makes the centralized mainframe-style management of distributed computing resources much easier to implement than with client-server paradigm. From user's perspective, the power and advantages of client-sever computing, even the convenience of PC are fu lly preserved with cloud computing. In addition, with the ever increasing adoptions of cloud computing, the underlying infrastructures of the future Internet will unavoidably be submerged in cloud. Given that cloud computing seems most directly evolved from grid computing, we can say that cloud computing takes the advantages of all previous five major computing paradigms fr om mainframe, PC, client-server, the Internet, grid computing.
AN OVERVIEW ON CLOUD COMPUTING SUPPORTED EMERGENCE RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT (CCS-ERM)
It is probably more difficult to defme emergency response and management (ERM) than to defme cloud computing 3 due to the extreme diversity of emergency events. Emergency events such as earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, snowstorms, and cyber attacks can be natural or artificial, gradual, sudden, or cyclical (seasonal), and often lead to crisis or disaster (Kelly 2010) . Each year, it is estimated that 200 million people are affected and 150,000 people died due to various crisis and disasters. ERM, often the relief response effort, is not only an important functional service of government, but also part of humanity performed by various organizations and individual citizens. Four stages are generally recognized in ERM: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (Kelly 2010) .
Of course, we humans have been dealing with emergency events fr om ancient times and from our births. The skills of ERM must have accompanied the evolution of human beings. Competition, cooperation and communication are three fundamental interactions that underlie evolution and many natural and engineered processes (Ma 2010) . It is obvious that cooperation is the very spirit (humanity) and fun damental fo rce of ERM, and communication plays a critical role in ERM. It is also obvious that the computing technology has greatly boosted our ERM capabilities, and play indispensable role in modern ERM activities.
The applications of computing technology to ERM, especially the Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) and wireless sensor networks (WSN) have been extensive in recent years (e.g., Ma & Krings 2008f, 2009 ). However, the advances of cloud computing in support of ERM have been slow. The National Science Foundation of China (NSFC) has launched a key research program titled "Emergency Response and Management of Unexpected Catastrophic Events." ( www.nsfc.gov.cnlnsfc/cenlxmzn/20 llxmzn/03/06.html) with a six year budget of 80-million Chinese dollars since 2008. One major proj ect in this research program is set for cloud computing supported ERM. The Idaho National Lab (INL) of the US Department of Energy in the US is building an emergency operating center (EOC) supported by cloud computing, but the platform will not be deployed until 2012 (EMI-SIG 2011) . In Europe, where In Europe, where privacy laws are more circumspect than in the US), cloud computing is not as popular as in the US (DoH-Cyber Security Division 2010). Instead, Europeans seem more interested in adopting online software and service delivery with secure hosted environments. UK government is probably an exception in Europe, but UK is more sanguine about private cloud. In Japan, cloud computing is promoted as industry strategy, rather than government IT strategy. Interestingly, Singapore government, US National Science Foundation, and the University of Illinois (UIVC), and a few US companies (HP, Intel, Yahoo) have been collaborating on a project termed Open Cirrus TM, which is developing techniques and software infrastructure to support cloud computing. The Open Cirrus is intended to build The Open Cirrus a testbed that consists of a collection of fe derated data centers for open-source systems and services research. Currently, there are six sites that host data centers for the Open Cirrus testbed. It should be noted that except for the fIrst two projects, i.e., the NSFC CSS-ERM proj ect and the US DoE INL EOC, the other cloud computing projects mentioned above are not designed specifIcally for ERM 
RELIABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF CLOUD COMPUTING
Like any computing platforms humans have invented, cloud computing is not perfect. For example, US Federal CIO (Chief Information OffIcer) has fo rmally issued Federal Cloud Computing Strategy in the February of 2011 with a budget of 20 billions, but the critics have raised serious security concerns with the migration plan. Although security may not always be a top concern in ERM, reliability and survivability of cloud computing for supporting ERM must always be addressed adequately to support the missions of ERM such as saving lives and protecting the critical national infrastructures (e., banking systems of a country). Currently, the unique issues associated with the reliability and survivability of cloud computing may have not received suffIcient attention, and the attention in the context of ERM is essentially missing.
According to US NIST, cloud computing is largely not new or untested. When it comes to reliability and survivability, we interpret this view as fo llows: much of the cloud computing is evolved fr om previous generations of computing technologies, and there are no revolutionary technological breakthroughs involved in the implementation of cloud computing. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no new technological issues that must be addressed 4 in cloud computing. In contrary, there are indeed some new issues regarding the security, reliability and survivability of cloud computing, especially due to the wide adoption of virtualization technology. For example, while virtualization is crucially positive for dealing with the heterogeneity in cloud computing, but its influences on security, reliability and survivability seem to be double edged sword. For example, while virtual machine (VM) technology can boost system reliability by using multiple VMs distributed over multiple heterogeneous host servers to form a cluster of VMs, and therefore should boost the reliability. Nevertheless, an isolated host server may become the single point of fa ilure for all the VMs it hosts. The net influence of virtualization will depend on the tradeoff of virtualization brought into cloud computing.
In the above Figure 1 , one host machine running Mac OS hosts several virtual machines running various OS such as Windows 7, Ubuntu, Windows XP, Fedora, Solaris. If the host machine crashes or becomes unstable, then all the VMs running on the host may lose the ground to survive. The host machine may become a single point of fa ilure. On the other hand, those VMs can be confIgured as isolated, and therefore, the fa ilure of one machine will not affe ct the reliability or security of other virtual machines. In most cases, the single point of fa ilure can be overcome by careful design. For example, by using two identical VM systems (i. e., two host machines with exactly the same guest VM confIgurations) and mirroring corresponding guest machines, the reliability of the whole system should be greatly improved, and the risk of single-point-of-failure becomes much less serious. Intuitively, VM technology increases the system complexity and therefore may increases the vulnerability to software bugs; this is not necessarily the case. For example, if the host system runs a more stable OS such as UNIX, the reliability of guest machine running a less stable OS on the host may actually be improved in comparison with running the guest OS directly on the same hardware.
The survivability of cloud computing should be improved if it is designed and built with fu ll consideration of survivability requirements. This is because virtualization technology can be harnessed to improve the survivability, especially the resilience or the capability to return to restore critical functionalities after a catastrophic fa ilure. For instance, restoring a VM is a much simple operation than restoring a traditional physical machine because the former can be as simple as a "copy" command. In addition, the capability to boost reliability in general also improves the survivability, especially the resistance aspect of the survivability . Therefore, the reliability and survivability of cloud computing depend on the proper design and implementation that fully consider the requirements of reliability and survivability. Although existing reliability and survivability theories and technologies are largely sufficient in meeting the requirements of reliability and survivability of cloud computing, the reliability and survivability of cloud computing are not automatically guaranteed without leveraging the advantages (such as the high flexibility in setup and restore of VMs, and the mirroring of VM across multiple host systems) of virtualization technologies to balance the potential disadvantages (such as single-point-of fa ilure) of virtualization. In other words, the key to achieve high reliability and survivability of cloud computing lies in proper design and implementation. If the requirements for supporting reliability and survivability are ignored in the design and implementation of cloud computing services, virtualization can easily become a source of troubles and lead to disaster. This situation is not much different from the current debates on the security of cloud computing in the context of Federal Cloud Computing Strategy. On the one side, the critics of the strategy deems that security challenges the current cloud computing fa ces makes the technology premature for the fe deral IT services. On the other hand, the advocates of the strategy believe that security is not a unique new issue to cloud computing and can be fully addressed with existing knowledge and technologies. We believes that the reliability and survivability of cloud computing can also be adequately addressed with the existing theories and technologies. What we are somewhat concerned is that insufficient attentions have been paid to the requirements of reliability and survivability in current design and implementation of cloud computing services.
RELIABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF CLOUD COMPUTING SUPPORTED ERM
It is clear that modern ERM systems consists of at least the fo llowing four dimensions or subsystems: (i) cloud computing services or computer networks prior to cloud computing becomes the dominant IT computing platform; (ii) ERM system; (iii) the physical system (e.g., banking system, a cohort of people trapped by a natural disaster) to be protected, restored or rescued by means of ERM system; (iv) ERM personnel including commanding team or the decision-maker. A problem with this dissection or classification of the ERM system is that it is hardly possible 5 to identify the boundaries of the fo ur subsystems. In other words, they are more like four side dimensions (faces) of a cube, and missing of one dimension may break the structure. Furthermore, the computer network or cloud computing services (in the case of our proposal), which is responsible for ensuring the proper interactions and communications among the four dimensions, is increasingly playing a critical role. Indeed, computer networks have become part of the ERM systems, and the network decision-maker interactions increasingly becomes the central nerve system or brain of an ERM system. Although the point seems to have rarely been explicitly made in existing literature, we recognize that the paradigm of survivability and survivable network systems (SNS) can serve as an architecture of the above described cloud computing (or computer network) supported ERM systems. In fa ct, survivability and SNS were initially developed to serve as driving theory and technology for protecting critical national infrastructures, one of the seven national critical infrastructures specified in the US President's 1999 Executive Orders, is emergency services. The fo llowing is an extremely brief summary on the background of survivability and survivable network systems.
The concept of survivability originated from the study of military survivability and nuclear deterrence strategy in the 1960s, but the currently prevalent survivability analysis (science) and survivable network systems (engineering) rapidly emerged in the last decade are near a total new scientific theory and engineering discipline, except that they preserve a core idea of survivability. The core idea is that survivable system must survive catastrophic events (especially those caused by human initiated malicious acts) by either preserving critical functionalities (resistance) or quickly recover from the loss of critical fu nctionalities (resilience). The technology and social background for the paradigms to emerge was that starting in 1990s, computer networks increas ingly control the nation's critical infrastructures, whose incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on defense or economic security. It was initiated as a research initiative to implement an Executive Order of the US President George Bush on the protection of critical national infrastructures in 1999, which specified 7 categories of critical infrastructures, including telecommunications, electrical power grids, gas and oil storage and transportation, water supply, emergency services, banking and [mance, and continuity of government services. Especially, after 9.l1 (200 1) and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (2005), the essence of survivability and survivable network systems (SNS) under various guise of terms (such as information assurance, cyber security, etc) entered the national security policy agenda pushed by multiple government agencies including US National Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, National Science Foundation, Department of Energy's National Labs. Since 1999, multiple US Presidents' executive orders, related to this agenda, have been issued. During their development processes, research on survivability have penetrated into and also draw fr om other relevant fields in computer science and engineering, most notably, security, reliability, dependability, and safety. Essentially, survivability is the civilian version of information warfare or defensive information warfare. Nevertheless, there have been few significant advances in quantitative research on survivability due to its necessity in dealing with potentially drastic uncertainties such as human malicious acts.
In a dissertation titled "Reliability and survivability analyses with survival analysis, dynamic hybrid fault models, and extended evolutionary game theory," Ma (2008) introduced a few new concepts, mathematical methods, and the strategies for designing and managing survivable network systems, including UUUR (uncertain, latent, unobserved, and unobservable risks), Byzantine generals 'playing' evolutionary game, dynamic hybrid fault models, three layer survivability, and extended evolutionary game theory (Ma & Krings 2008a -d, 2009a . In the last few years, the work has been extended into a general modeling and simulation architecture that can be applied to the study of complex engineering, biological (ecological), and social systems, where the risk analysis and management are a core issue. Several important applications, including prognostics and health management (PHM) of aerospace systems, reliability and survivability of distributed networks, etiology of human microbiome associated diseases and frailty analysis for personalized medicine, strategic information warfare, and survivability in cloud computing, have been attempted or conceived.
We argue that the above discussed survivability and SNS paradigms are generally applicable for capturing the functionalities and missions of the CCS-ERM illustrated with Figure 2 , especially the physical system entities (e.g., infrastructures) and cloud computing services (or computer networks). In fa ct, the combined system of infrastructure and computer network is the very "system" the original survivable network system paradigm refers to.
The two other components in Figure 2 , ERM is often closely integrated with (or part of) both the infrastructure and computing networks that support the infrastructure. The cloud computing often supports both ERM and the 6 infrastructures directly. The ERM personnel are often the commanding center or decision-makers.
Since much of existing survivability research has been fo cused on the survivability of the computer networks (cloud computing services in the case of this article), and also the survivability of ERM and ERM personnel systems are more about human fa ctors in management, the key research agenda in the CCS-ERM systems depicted in Figure 2 is then the survivability of the infrastructure. Nevertheless, due to the extreme diverse nature of infrastructure, it is very difficult to develop a general architecture and/or approach for analyzing the survivability of various kinds of infrastructures, and the analysis should be done on case-by-case basis. In the fo llowing section, we present an example of the survivability analysis of banking systems.
THE RESEARCH AGENDA WITH BANKING SYSTEM AS AN EXAMPLE
As stated previously, we consider that the reliability and survivability of a CSS-ERM system depend on the reliability and survivability of its components, especially those of the physical system (infrastructure) and the network system that supports the whole system and missions, which in our case is the cloud computing. In fa ct, the critical infrastructure and the network system are so closely integrated that the survivability and survivable network system (SNS) have been advanced to study the protection of the infrastructure. The problem of ERM is essentially the same as the problem of critical infrastructure protection, and indeed, ERM is one of the seven critical national infrastructures designated by the US President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP).
If we wish to emphasize the difference between EMR and other critical infrastructures, it is the somewhat two ad-hoc components: the ERM and management system and the EMR personnel. Obviously, the two other components: physical system and network exist implicitly in the ERM systems. Of course, the system reliability/survivability is not the simple addition of the reliabilities of its components at all; the interdependencies among the components are equally important with, if not more than, the influences of its components. In the simplest case, if the fo ur components can be considered as a series system of independent components, then the reliability of the whole system is equal to the product of the reliabilities of its components. In reality, the independency assumption is hardly realistic, and the relationship should be much more complex. The survivability will be even more complex due to the additional uncertainties, vulnerabilities, and fr ailty. Therefore, traditional reliability and survivability analysis approaches usually can provide very limited helps to the study of critical infrastructure protection, including ERM systems. Instead, more recent advances such as dynamic hybrid fault models (DHF), survival analysis, extended evolutionary game theory (EEGT), three-layer survivability analysis, resilience, and tipping point theory may provide more useful approaches to the reliability and survivability of critical infrastructures including ERM systems. As we have argued repeatedly, ERM is essentially a survivability problem. In the fo llowing, we use banking system as an example to propose a research agenda (architecture) for evolving (design and management in traditional sense) of a survivable banking system. We humans live in communities, and so do the biological species. A work defmition of biological (or ecological) community is the assemble of biological species, which can be plants, animals, microbes, virus, bacteria phages, plasmids, etc. In our living communities, we all belong to Homo sapiens, but strictly, we identify ourselves as races, ethnic groups, different countries, families, sexes. The first shared property between biological community and the community we humans form is that both are assembles of somewhat heterogeneous entities and those entities interact with each other.
A second shared property between biological community and living community is that both communities are dynamic in both time and space. A third shared property is that both communities are influenced by environment. It should be emphasized that, although the fo cal entity of community ecology is community, the study of environment is equally important for understanding community dynamics.
Community ecology is one of the oldest and also the most important branches of ecology. It studies the spatial and temporal dynamics as well as their relationships with environment. Although community dynamics should be approached from both the structure and fu nction perspectives, few existing studies have adopt such a joint strategy. The majority studies on community dynamics were conducted from the structure perspective. The minority of studies from functional perspective in macro ecology have been conducted in the context of ecosystem energetics or fo od web. Accordingly much of the theory for community dynamics has been developed from the structure perspective. Since community structure or composition is often measured with community diversity (or complexity), and therefore, the study of community dynamics is often centered on the analysis of community diversity (complexity) in time and space. Some of the most commonly studied properties of community dynamics include: diversity (evenness and richness) and its dynamic changes, diversity-stability-disturbance paradigm, from which some of the most prominent ecological theories in community ecology were developed, including species area-time (SAT) curves and island biogeography theory, species abundance distribution (SAD), neutral theory, diversity-stability paradigm, intennediate disturbance hypothesis (IDH), etc.
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Community can also be modeled as a network of species, or species interaction networks. One of the most extensively studied species interaction networks is fo od web, in which the species in the community are linked by fe eding relationships. Other species interaction networks, or ecological networks, include mutualistic networks, parasitoid-host networks. In these ecological networks, nodes are species, and links are various species relationships (interactions such as predation, mutualism, parasitism, etc).
In 2006, US National Academy of Science and Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter NASFRB) initiated a joint proj ect titled "New directions for understanding systemic risks" and participated by some 100 experts from 22 countries. The initiative was motivated by the realization that, there was little understanding on the systemic risk of the banking system as a whole (or bank networks) given that individual banks vigorously pursue various strategies for maximizing profits and minimizing risks. The project was targeted to draw inspiration from engineering, ecology and some other selected fields of science, and the subsequent events further steered the research to seek ideas for potential regulatory refonns that can minimize systemic risk but still allow appropriate degree of risk-taking by individual banks. It is remarkable that eminent ecologist Lord Robert May led the project, and furthennore, ecological principles and models played a core role in analyzing the systemic risks of current banking systems and deriving recommendation to policy-makers (National Research Council of the National Academies. 2007). In section 6.2, we present a very brief summary on the recent advances in the ecological approach to banking system performed by May and his colleagues, but in the remainder of this subsection, we first present a conceptual introduction on the analogy of banking system as an ecological community. We do not necessarily fo llow the conventions and concepts in May et ai's studies (May et al. 2008 , May & Arinaminpathy 2010 , Haldane & May 2011 , but the idea should be consistent. Of course, the errors in our presentation are our own.
By analogy, banks in fm ancial system can be considered as forming a community. Figure 3 is a diagram that abstracts banking system as a counterpart of biological community. In this illustrative diagram, we see the 'environment' of the banking system, consisting of government regulations, economies, various types of warfare (military, financial, & infonnation), natural disasters, etc. Any of the environment fa ctors may influence the dynamic structure, fu nctionalities and of the banking system. The central rectangular box represents the banking system from a structure perspective; the community of banks is composed of various types (the counterparts of biological species in a biological community) such as central banks, retailer, investment, private, etc. The five small boxes in the center capture the major interactions and processes that are going on in a typical banking system. These interactions (processes) include: splitting and collapsing (e.g. , bankruptcy) (similar to natural death or extinction in biological community), merge and acquisition (predation in biological community), commensalism, competitIOn and mutualism (e.g., ally between banks). In community ecology, commensalism refers to species relationship, in which one species benefit from the association, and another species is neither benefited, nor disadvantaged. This relationship is not unlike the relationship between investment bank and retailer bank. The box below the five process boxes indicates the fundamental problems of "bank community ecology", i. e., structure, function, and dynamics of banking system. The two boxes in the bottom remind us the difference between the risk of an individual bank and systemic risk of the banking system as a whole. Furthermore, individual banks may have different frailties, which further complicate the estimation of systemic risk. This is one of the main problems May and his colleagues have addressed in a recent series of papers (May et al. 2008 , May & Arinaminpathy 2010 . Similar problems also exist in personalized medicine, where fr ailty analysis offers a powerful approach to studying the relationship between individual and population risks (Ma et al. 20 1 1b) . (May 1973) , have realized that, contrary to then commonly-held belief that complex ecosystem is more stable, instead, complexity can be a destabilizing fo rce in breaking the balance. For example, in a randomly assembled community of N interacting species, the community can experience a sharp phase transition from 8 overall stability to instability when the number and strength of interactions among species grow, and the transition can predicted by a simple mathematical relation: ma2 > I, where m is the average number of links per species, and a is the average strength of the links. May's (1973) theoretic work with model ecosystem spawned an avalanche of studies on the complexity-stability problem both theoretically and experimentally since 1970s, which have been expanding with the latest direction pointed to the approaches from "new science of networks" initiated by Erdos & Renyi's (1960) random graph theory and rejuvenated by Watts & Strogatz (1998) , Barabasi & Albert (1999) seminal papers. In recent years, lots of further advances on ecological networks have been achieved and extensive literatures in this field, including some excellent reviews (e.g., Dunne 2005 , Ings et al. 2009 ) have been published. More recently, the state-of-the-art research on community dynamics seems to have been shifted to two critically important issues: (i) the validity of the assumption of community equilibriums; (ii) the roles of cooperation and communications in community dynamics. Firstly, most existing ecological theories, including community dynamics theory, either implicitly or explicitly contain the assumption of equilibrium. This status is not only due to our tendency to believe that nature should be in balance or equilibrium states, but also due to our limited ability in analyzing non equilibrium systems in science. Secondly, the current fo od web network centered community analysis largely ignores the roles of cooperation and communication (behavior) in community dynamics.
Government Regulations & Economies ("
In the study of stability (dynamics) of ecological communities (networks), the current challenge is not the recognition of the missing aspects; rather it is how to incorporate them into existing theoretical frameworks. In contrast, in the study of the balance of financial ecosystem, or stability of fm ancial networks, studies similar to those performed in ecology in the last few decades were not present until May Haldane & May (2011) also clearly identified the major differences between fm ancial and ecological systems. The fu st difference is that today's ecosystems are the products of millions of years' evolutionary selection, and the evolutionary history of current financial system is only a couple of hundred years. The regulatory hands of governments, which are often passionate due to the concern of "too big to fa il," certainly have deep influences on the evolution and establishment of current fm ancial systems. It is therefore often the case that the fattest, rather than the fittest, survive in banking industry. The individual banks are connected as a network via IE activities. Most studies on bank networks prior to May & Arinaminpathy (20 10) were performed with simulation analysis and on the assumption of Erdos-Renyi random network. May & Arinaminpathy (20 10) noticed that the 9 topology of US Fedwire system is highly non-random, with a few big banks connected to many small banks. Furthermore, they used analytic approach (mean field approximations for the networks) to study the non-random network, which help to deepen and generalize some insights. Their study sets an exceptional example that theoretical ecology, just like theoretical physics, can find broad applications beyond biology. It should be natural for other ecological models such as community niche model, evolutionary game theory models to fm d similar applications in the study of financial ecosystems.
By studying the interbank network model system with the principles and models from ecology, May & Arinaminpathy (20 10) tackled the big question: how banking system fa ilure such as displayed in 2008 global financial crisis could occur. The principles, models, and methods May & Arinaminpathy adopted in their study are fam iliar to ecologists. In fa ct, the mathematics employed by May and his colleagues is simpler than many mathematical models in fm ancial engineering or mathematical finance that is used to engineer the complex fm ancial derivatives. The latter often requires very sophisticated mathematics such as measure theoretic probability theory, fun ctional analysis, and partial differential equations. Yet, the results and conclusions May and his colleagues draw not only offer deep insights into the problems inherent in prevailing methods of pricing complex derivatives, or arbitrage pricing theory (APT), but also demonstrate the beauty and elegance of theoretical (mathematical) ecology.
In (Liabilities)
Out ( Their studies also support Caccioli et aI's (20 10) conclusion that APT is part of the problem, since APT is not a 'theory' in the traditional sense of sciences. Instead, APT is a set of idealized assumptions upon which much of the mathematical fm ance or fm ancial engineering is built upon (Haldane & May 2011 ). The tragedy is that those idealized assumptions may be out of touch with reality. When they are introduced into real world fm ancial systems, the assumptions become self-fulfilling theory. Even if the theory is mathematically correct, the practical implications in real world can be a totally different matter.
Three-Layer Survivability Analysis and its Application to Banking System Survivability
The so-termed three-layer survivability analysis (Ma 2008 ) is a general quantitative approach (architecture) that can be applied to model and analyze the survivability of physical systems (e.g., critical infrastructures) or information system (e.g., wireless sensor networks or cloud computing services). In this general architecture, reliability and survivability have a unified definition and a set of modeling approaches. The three layers refer to tactical, strategic, and operation levels.
At the tactical level, reliability is largely equivalent to survivability when the influences of UUUR (uncertainty, latent, unobserved, and unobservable risks) events can be ignored or postponed the next levels-strategic and operational levels. The mathematical tool at the tactical level is usually survival analysis, reliability theory, or other similar methods such as the first passage problem and random walks. The individual (component) properties are often addressed at the tactical level.
At the strategic level, the fo cus is often systemic risks, or the reliability and survivability of the whole system are studied. Due to the existence of redundancy, which includes spatial and/or temporal redundancy and is necessary for achieving reliability and survivability, a key mathematical tool is the dynamic hybrid fault models (DHF) (Ma 2008 ) and the extended evolutionary game theory modeling (EEGT) (Ma 2008 , Ma 2009 , Ma & Krings 2010 . DHF converted traditional static (or discrete) and qualitative hybrid fault models into time-dependent and survival (reliability) based probabilistic models. Furthermore, DHF introduces the so-termed "Byzantine Generals Playing Evolutionary Game" to deal with the dynamic nature of reliability and survivability. This notion refers to the extension of classic Agreement algorithms from distributed computing with survival analysis and evolutionary game theory modeling. When agreement algorithms are not limited to the Agreement algorithms (developed from Byzantine Generals problem) in distributed computing, this integration of survival analysis (from strategic level), agreement algorithms, and evolutionary game theory becomes more general extended evolutionary 10 game theory (EEGT). EEGT then should be applicable to any problems to which traditional evolutionary game theory (EGT) is applicable since EEGT simply makes EGT more realistic in describing the dynamic behaviors of game players.
At the operation level, the execution of the tactics and strategies obtained from the analyses conducted at the previous two layers is the key. In other words, this is a level that manages survivable network systems. The principle of hedging is adopted to deal with the impact of UUUR events. There are two critical concepts and corresponding models, which are supported by complex mathematical and computational models developed at tactical and strategic levels, i. e., expected survivability (ES) and threshold survivability (TS). It is through the coordinated management efforts based on the values of ES & TS, that the system survivability is maintained.
To apply the three-layer survivability analysis, we must first identify the system to be analyzed. In the case of banking system survivability (and ERM), the system (Figure 2 ) consists of two main sub-systems: the cloud computing service and the banking system itself, since the other two systems (personnel and ERM) are usually integrated into the two main systems. For example, the ERM personnel are most likely the same personnel who support a bank's IT team (who should manage their cloud computing team). For each of the two main systems, we can apply the three-layer survivability analysis, but the analysis and management of the two systems must be integrated as an organic whole, which is best approached at the operational level ( Figure 5 ). In the above Figure 5 , we can see two interconnected three layer survivable systems: banking system and cloud computing service that supports the mission of the banking system. We also see that both systems share a common operational level, which is necessary because there must be a centralized management and commanding system in place that executes the tactics, strategies, and policies dictated by the common mission of the organization (which can be a financial company or a country's banking system). The necessity of this shared level is also obvious fr om management perspective. In fa ct, we omit the whole management system from CEO to CTO, from COB (Chairman of the Board), to government regulatory agencies. Ideally, the interface with the latter bodies should occur at the operational level, although some of them should defmitely be involved in the analysis and design of the two lower layers. At the bottom of the diagram are the necessary and reliable fa cilities supports such as physical security, HR, and logistics.
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Joint Opemtiooal
It should be noted that the requirements to separate both banking system and cloud computing service in the middle of the above diagram (Fig. 5) are two-fold. The first is that both systems, i. e., the infrastructure and cloud computing (essentially IT support system) are of different nature and culture. Second, cloud computing may be an outsourced service to large IT enterprises such as IBMTM or even Amazon™ who owns one of the currently most popular cloud computing services (i. e., EC2-Elastic Compute Cloud. http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/fags/) .
Evolving a Survivable Banking System
From above review and discussions, we can see the enormous complexities involved in the system design and management, not to mention the possible missing gaps. Some of the gaps have been intentionally omitted in this article to avoid overwhelmingly complex details, and others may have slipped our sights. For example, we have never explicitly discussed near ubiquitous nonlinear interactions in both ecological and financial systems. Yet, it is a fa ct and reality theoretically (mathematically) and practically that nonlinearity is often the mother source of all the bizarre dynamical behaviors we have observed in both nature and in fm ancial world. Since the 1960s, enormous advances have been made under the general umbrella of complexity science, as well as in various disciplines of natural and social sciences and engineering. New concepts and research fields such as catastrophe theory, butterfly effect, chaos theory, phase transitions, small world network, power law & scale-free networks, resilience & tipping point theory, have become part of science and technology jargons. Yet, there are two phenomena that seem to have changed little: one is that the inherent unpredictability of complex systems continues to "disappoint" us, but the emergent orders (patterns) displayed by complex system keep teasing our curiosities and hopes for better understanding, designing and management of complex systems. Recent advances suggest that traditional design and management approaches seem to offer little help. Researchers and practitioners increasingly look into, more favorably than ever, the algorithm of evolution, from both perspectives of Darwin's 11 biological evolution and computational evolution to solve real world hard problems. Evolution by natural selection is essentially a computing algorithm: any system that possesses replication, variation, and competition has the potential to evolve by adapting in response to the relevant external variables affecting the system (Banzhaf et al. 2006, Foster 20 10) . Besides competition, cooperation and communication should also play equally important roles in the evolution of biological or non-biological systems. The study of cooperation, especially when fo rmulated as prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, has generated extensive interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary ramifications. Today, there is hardly a scientific field that has not been touched by the study of cooperation. In contrast, the study of communication has been a relatively recent advance. For example, the handicap principle that is now considered to govern the honesty of animal communication was only accepted widely in the later 1990s (Zahavi 1997 ). Yet, the critical importance of communication is obvious because it can modulate the competition and cooperation. In the analogy of banking system with biological community, (Figure 3) , we can see all three forces: competition, cooperation and communication are in effect. The adoptions of evolutionary game theory (EGT) and extended EGT in our previously discussions should fu rther fa cilitate the evolutionary approach to the problems we are interested in this article.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Scoping the CCS-ERM System: what have not been covered in previous sections
We propose a survivability and evolution centered research agenda for cloud computing supported ERM system. In the fo llowing, we summarize the main contents of the proposed research agenda, but first, we need to scope the research problem more precisely by further elaborating on the fo llowing three issues.
People: ERM is ultimately a management problem, which is both science and art. Significant portion of the ERM involves people, for example, ERM personnel or people to be protected from the jeopardy of catastrophe. Often, the art part of the activities involving people is best managed by law, policies, and/or regulations for law abided citizens. In other words, the critical important of relevant law, regulations, and policies are recognized in the proposed CSS-ERM systems, but it is not the fo cus of this article since this article is more about research agenda and architecture. What laws and regulations can accomplish for an ERM system should be written in implementation and management manuals. On the other hand, for human initiated malicious actions (intrusions/attacks), which can be illegal, survivability is designed to deal with the malicious nature of those activities. Although we do not deal with legal sanctions against illegal activities, the so-termed UUUR concepts in survivability paradigm can be utilized to capture the influences and consequences of malicious actions. The malicious actions are dealt with at the more technical level because while law can penalize people for their behaviors, but it is often beyond the capability of law to remedy for the consequences of the malicious actions, especially in the case of ERM due to extremely high sensitivity of timing.
Diversity of ERM Systems:
The second issue in defining and ERM systems is the extremely high diversity of ERM systems. Diffe rent ERM systems can have very different missions, personnel, structure, functionalities, logistics, urgency time framework, spatial scope, chain reactions, long term effects, the relationship with environment etc. Therefore, it is unrealistic to develop a general CCS ERM or any ERM that is applicable to various kinds of emergency events or catastrophes. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that there are certain general characteristics underlying many, if not all, ERM systems. It is those special characteristics, and principles and methodologies which are particularly suitable for studying them, that prompt us to develop the research agenda outlined in this article.
Security: Is security important for survivability or ERM? Indeed, it is frequently of critical importance. However, similar to the diversity of emergency events, security (whether physical, information, or network security) is extremely diverse. It is beyond the reach to consider detailed technological aspects of the security in a research agenda such as we propose. In fa ct, it is not necessary to get into the details of security in our research agenda. Indeed, when the paradigm of survivability and survivable network system (SNS) were initiated in the late 1990s, security has already been recognized as top headache of IT technologies and the security industry has already emerged to increasingly take shares from the fe llow sectors of IT industry. Yet, it was already clear that security alone is not adequate for assuming the mission required for protecting critical national infrastructure. It is often the case that security itself requires the support of reliable and survivable environment. For example, without reliable hardware and software, security can only be a beautiful blueprint on paper. Without the safeguard of survivable strategies and tactics in place, security may be wiped out by a simple physical security violation or the betrayal of a disgruntled network administrator. Of course, some of these issues have been dealt within the framework of security policy; nevertheless, the security policy is designed in the context of security needs of an organization. The problem is that the security needs often ignore some of the critical requirements identified by the survivability paradigm, such as some of the UUUR risks, and fault-tolerance design (e.g., Byzantine generals playing evolutionary games). In contrast, the paradigm of survivability and SNS have been developed to include some instruments (concepts, principles and methods) to incorporate security aspects necessary for fulfilling the missions of protecting critical national infrastructure or emergency response and management.
Executive Summary of the Research Agenda
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The goal of the research agenda we propose is to develop an architecture for cloud computing supported (CCS) emergency response and management (ERM) system (CCS ERM). The architecture, when applied to a CSS-ERM for a specific type of emergency event such as banking system, can be utilized to build (evolve) a survivability-centered ERM system. Compared with existing architectures and ERM systems, our research agenda, when implemented possesses the fo llowing unique fe atures:
(1) Survivability is the lifeline of the CCS-ERM system our research agenda advocates and implement. The CCS-ERM system we propose to build is a survivable network system (SNS) that consists of at least two interconnected subsystems: the physical system (infrastructure, e.g., banking system) and the cloud computing service that supports the protection of critical infrastructure or the mission of an ERM system (Figure 2) . Depending on the kinds of ERM, there may be other regular or ad-hoc systems (components), for example, ad hoc ERM personnel (rescue teams) in case of natural disasters.
The internal structure of the SNS for CSS-ERM is both hierarchical and compartmental ( Figure  5 ). The compartmental structure refers to the relative separation between the infrastructure and cloud computing service, but both compartments are interconnected with the bidirectional flow of information, and fe edbacks. The hierarchical structure refers to the three-layer survivability models for each of the two interconnected parallel compartments. Those three layers are : tactical, strategic, and operation levels. Each of the three layers functionally supports the layer(s) on top of the current layer, and three peer-pairs are formed In one word, survivability is the lifeline and architecture of CCS-ERM sys tem (Ma & Krings 2008a -d, 20 11, Ma 2008 , Ma 2010 .
(2) Both the Evolution by natural selection (Darwin's biological evolution theory) and evolution by artificial selection (computational evolution) are optuTIlzation algorithms (Banzhaf et al. 2006 , Foster 20 10, Ma 2011a . In nature, the extant species is evolved by natural selection and it is the fittest that survives. We not only take the inspiration fr om evolution for building CCS-ERM, but actually evolve (compute with computational evolution) the system. The example of the former case includes using ants colony relocation as a strategy for the transfer of besieged refuges in a natural disaster such as hurricane Katrina. The example of the latter includes the using of ants colony op timization (A CO) algorithm, which is a general-purpose computational algorithm, .e.g., to find the optimal cloud computing service configuration.
In one word, evolution is the algorithm to compute the implementation of the survivability-centered CCS-ERM architecture (Foster 20lO, Ma 20 11a) (3) Biological (e cological) inspirations can be rich sources of ideas for designing survivable CSS-ERM systems. For example, the analogy between ecological community (ecosystem) and banking system (Figures 3 & 4) , prompt May and his colleagues to re-think the "survival of the fattest" and "too big to fa il" management notions in banking industry. By conducting ecological modeling and network analysis of banking system, May and his colleagues (May et al. 2008, May & In general, bio-robustness and ecological stability should be rich sources of survivability (Ma & Krings 2008d ).
(4) Th ree-layer survivability analysis, which consists of a set of mathematical and computational methodologies (Ma 2008 , Ma et al. 2009a , can be harnessed to analyze the requirements of CCS-ERM system and fu rther "design" (compute by evolution algorithms) CCS-ERM systems. As mentioned previously, the three layer survivability analysis can be applied to both CCS and the infrastructure (physical system).
At the tactical level, standard reliability analysis and survival analysis (Ma 2008 , Ma & Krings 2008a 1), as well as other relevant mathematical approaches such as the first passage time (FPT) (Ma et al. 2009b) , random walks can be utilized to analyze the reliability of the CCS ERM components (such as bank nodes). An advantage of survival analysis is its inherent capability in dealing with censored information, which can be utilized to assess the consequences ofUUUR events.
At the strategic level, dy namic hybrid fa ult models (DHF) (Ma & Krings 2008e, Ma 2008 ) and extended evolutionary game theory (EEGT) (Ma 2008 , Ma & Krings 2011 can be harnessed to model the behavior of CSS-ERM system such as real-time fault tolerance level and reliability, as well as survivable strategies, which can be captured with the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of evolutionary games. Furthermore, survival analysis and DHF can be employed to extended evolutionary game models so that complex system level behaviors (e.g., risks) can be assessed adequately.
The survivable strategies obtained from the strategic level can be enacted by a joint operational layer of CCS and the physical infrastructure (e.g., banking system). The notion of expected survivability (ES) and threshold survivability (TS) are, in fa ct, should be complex software functions, that guide the ERS management personnel to make decisions on the state-of-the-emergency world (Ma 2008 , Ma et al. 2009a , Ma & Krings 2011 .
In summary, when implemented, three-layer survivability analysis should be a computing environment (software) for evolving survivable CCS-ERM systems. The mathematical models and approaches associated with the three-layers, such as survival analysis, extended evolutionary games, FPT, random walks, swarm intelligence are the algorithms and models to build the three-layer computing environment. Extended evolutionary game modeling (EGGT) can be a general modeling methodology since the methodology can be further extended to deal with more complex problems in building CCS-ERM. Existing EEGT includes the extensions with survival analysis (for describing the lifetime of game players), agreement algorithms (AA) (Ma 2008 , Ma & Krings 2008e, 2011 . Further extensions such as with graph theory modeling should be worthwhile to dealing with space topology problem in ERM. Finally, evolutionary computing and other bio-inspired computing are expected to play an important role in the implementation of the architecture our research agenda aims to develop. Andrew Hess is a 1969 graduate of the Un iversity of Virginia (B S Aerospace Engineering) and the U. S. Navy Test Pilot School. Andy attended George Washington Un iversity working towards a Masters in Te chnology Management and has completed many Navy and DOD sp onsored professional and acquisition management courses.
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